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FILED

JUL 25 2012

RICHARD W. WIEKING
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE

Attorneys for Defendant
JASON HOOSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JASON HOOSON, et al.,

Defendant.

NO: 5-12-CR-00210 HRL

STIPULATION AND ~~(PROPOSED)~~
ORDER FOR MOVING JULY 26,
2012 STATUS HEARING, AND
EXCLUDING TIME

Defendants, Jason Hooson and Jason Stansbury, through their counsel Richard P. Pointer and David Johnson and the United States through Meredith J. Edwards hereby stipulate to the continuance of the status hearing from July 26, 2012, at 1:30 p.m., to August 30, 2012, at 1:30 p.m.

It is agreed between the parties that the following reasons exist for this stipulation:

(1) The parties are in discussions and need additional time to reach an agreement.

(2) United States Attorney, Meredith J. Edwards, has no objection to having the status conference continued.

The government and defense stipulate that the factors stated above provide a basis for an exclusion of time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. Section 3161 (h)(7)(B)(iv) in that the

ends of justice outweigh the public interest in an earlier trial date.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 25, 2012

/s/Richard P. Pointer
Richard P. Pointer
Attorney for Jason Hooson

Dated: July 25, 2012

/s/ David Johnson
David Johnson
Attorney for Jason Stansbury

Dated: July 25, 2012

/s/ Meredith J. Edwards
Meredith J. Edwards
Assistant United States Attorney

ORDER OF COURT

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, and for good cause shown, the Court reschedules the parties' July 26, 2012, status hearing to August 30, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS time be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act from July 26, 2012 to August 30, 2012. The court finds, based on the aforementioned reasons, that the ends of justice is served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2012


HOWARD R. LLOYD
Magistrate United States District Judge